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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEGGY BEZNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 14119

vs
CONTINENTAL DRY CLEANERS,
INC., a Corporation, and
BERT HARRY,
Defendants and Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by plaintiff to rescind a
contract for the purchase of a dry cleaning business for
fraudulent misrepresentation and for termination of a lease
agreement for a breach by defendants.

Defendants filed a counter-

claim seeking a judgment for payments claimed due on the contract
for the purchase of the dry cleaning business and for delinquent
rent payments under the lease agreement.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.

The jury returned a verdict

in favor of plaintiff by special verdict.

(R. 40-41).

Plaintiff

filed a motion for judgment on the verdict in the Third District
Court, Earnest F. Baldwin, Judge, entered a judgment in favor
of plaintiff in the sum of $10,670.00 (R. 29-30).

Defendants1

motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict, or in the alternative,
for a new trial, was denied (R. 33-34).

Defendants have appealed
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-2the judgment on the verdict.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully requests the Court to sustain
the special verdict of jury in favor of plaintiff with instructions
to the Lower Court to increase the judgment of the Lower Court
on the verdict to include all sums paid on the principle portion
of the purchase contract by plaintiff to defendants under the
contract rescinded.

Respondent also requests that the Court

reverse the Lower Court on the issue of breach of lease with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff against
the defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent takes exception to the facts set forth by
appellant, and therefore restates the facts of the case.
Respondent, Peggy Bezner, came to Salt Lake City, Utah, in June
of 1972, from Kansas City, where she had been employed by Hercules,
Inc., and not from Omaha, Nebraska, as stated by appellant in
their brief (T. 84). Prior to coming to Utah, she wrote to a
Mr. Zorn in the fall of 1971, about buying new equipment for a
dry cleaning shop (T. 85). Mr. Zorn, in replying to Mrs. Bezner's
inquiry, told her of existing dry cleaning businesses that were
for sale (T. 86). When Mrs. Bezner arrived in Salt Lake City,
Mr. Zorn took her to see dry cleaning businesses that were for
sale.

When Mr. Steadman arrived in Salt Lake City, from Kansas,

in August, 1972, Mr. Zorn took both Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman
to see the businesses he had shown Mrs. Bezner, one of which
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-3was the In-and-Out Sixty Minute Dry Cleaners owned and operated
by defendant, Continental Dry Cleaners (T. 7, 8, 9, 86). Mr. Steadman
had operated a part time carpet, drapery and upolstery business
in Kansas, and wanted to continue in this type of business.

Mr.

Steadman was interested in investing in a business with Mrs.
Bezner and was looking at dry cleaning businesses with her (T. 7).
Mr. Zorn was the owner of Alliance Equipment Company which was
in the business of selling dry cleaning equipment and had sold
the equipment to Continental Dry Cleaners for the In-and-Out Sixty
Minute Dry Cleaners (T. 104, 208, 210).
Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman expressed some interest in the
In-and-Out Dry Cleaners, and on or about August 24, 1972, Mr.
Zorn introduced both Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman to Mr.
Bert Harry, the president and principle stockholder of Continental
Dry Cleaners (T. 14, 87, 174). At this initial meeting, Mr. Harry
told Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman that the asking price for the
In-and-Out Cleaners was $40,000.00.

Mr. Steadman asked Mr. Harry

how the price was established, and Mr. Harry said that the business
was grossing at that time $1,000.00 per week, and the price
included approximately $31,000.00 in equipment, inventory and
goodwill (T. 15, 88). During this first meeting there was
discussion about Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman operating selfservice gas pumps in connection with the dry cleaning business.
Mr. Harry represented that the possibility existed of establishing
a self-service station (T. 15-16, 89-90).
A second meeting took place between Mrs. Bezner, Mr. Steadman
and Mr. Harry on August 26, 1972, at the Continental Plant located
the Howard
W. Hunter
Library, J.Lake
Reuben Clark
Law School,
at 5th South Digitized
and by7th
East,
inLawSalt
City
(T.BYU.
17). At this
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4meeting Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman made an offer to purchase
the In-and-Out Cleaners for $35,000.00.

Mr. Harry flew into

a rage and said it was absolutely out of the question (T. 18).
Mr. Harry again told Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman that the price
was $40,000.00, and that this price represented the fact that
the business was doing a substantial volume of $1,000.00 per
week (T. 18, 91, 92). Mr. Harry then proposed a partnership
arrangement with Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman.

This proposal

was immediately rejected by both Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman
(T. 18, 90). The possibility of self-service gas was again
discussed at the second meeting, and Mr. Harry provided Mrs.
Bezner with the name and telephone number of an oil company
representative.

He also represented that the gas tanks were

still there buried under the ground, and that the building
which has the cleaning business had been operated as a service
station (T. 19, 90, 163, 164). Mr. Harry claimed that he
showed a lease between Continental Dry Cleaners and the prior
owner of the service station to Mrs. Bezner at this meeting,
and that Mr. Bezner, the husband of Mrs. Bezner, who was not
present at any of the meetings, was supposed to have pointed out
that there was a restriction in the lease concerning the operation
of a service station (T. 163, 164). The terms of purchase were
also discussed, should Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman agree to buy
the In-and-Out Cleaners (T. 21, 89).
During the meeting with Mr. Harry at the Continental Dry
Cleaners Plant, both Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman requested to
see financial records concerning the operation of the cleaning
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-5business.

Mr. Harry told Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman that he

had no accurate records of what the shop was doing in that his
prior manager was supposed to have been stealing him blind (T. 24,
43, 91). When Mr. Harry made the representation that he had no
accurate records of what the shop was doing, his wife, Clair
Harry, had been operating the In-and-Out Cleaners for 2h to 3
months, had maintained daily records, and records were kept on
each store, including the In-and-Out at the main office of
Continental (T. 175, 176, 202). Mr. Harry explained that he had no
accurate records of what, in fact, the In-and-Out Cleaners was doing
because the plant was doing work for other plants owned by Continental,
was doing Army work of 2,000 pieces per week, and some drapery work
(T. 177). Katherine Winters, a former employee of Continental
Dry Cleaners, who had worked at the In-and-Out Plant, testified
that the work from other plants was the so-called "Army Contract"
and consisted of less than 100 pieces per day (600 per week at
an average price per item of .14 cents) (T. 178, 221, 222).
Mr. Harry testified that the Army Contract was for one year
beginning March, 1972, to March, 1973 (T. 178).
It was established by the testimony of Mr. Fannin (T. 63, 64),
Clair Harry (T. 202, 205, 206), and Katherine Winters (T. 219),
that daily records of what the shop was doing had been kept from
the beginning and that Mr. Harry, Mrs. Harry and their sons had
picked up these daily receipts and daily records from the In-and-Out
Cleaners and turned them into the main office.

Mrs. Clair Harry
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-6further testified that she had received instructions to remove
all records from the In-and-Out Cleaners prior to Mrs. Bezner
assuming ownership and that the records had been picked up by
the drivers (T. 201, 202).
After the second meeting with Mr. Harry, Mrs. Bezner and
Mr. Steadman agonized over the decision of whether to purchase
the In-and-Out Sixty Minute Dry Cleaners or to start a new business
for 2h days (T. 25, 92). Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman decided
to purchase the In-and-Out Cleaners in reliance primarily upon
Mr. Harry's representations that the business was grossing $1,000.00
per week.

Also, the fact that they would be able to offer self-

service gas operations with it and that the value of the equipment
was represented to be $31,000.00, with some inventory and goodwill^
that the name was established and the name In-and-Out would be
advertised and they could trade on the advertising (T. 19, 29, 93).
A purchase agreement was subsequently entered into between Continental
Dry Cleaners as Seller, and Mrs. Bezner and Mr. Steadman as Buyer
(T. 46, 100). However, Mr. Harry never provided Mrs. Bezner or
Mr. Steadman with a schedule of equipment in connection with
the purchase agreement (T. 44, 101 and 102). Mrs. Bezner had
made inquiry about putting in the self-service gas pumps prior
to taking possession of the business.

Around October 10th or

11th, 1972, after she had taken possession of the business, she
was informed that she could not operate self-service gas pumps
in connection with the cleaning business (T. 97, 98, 99). Mr.
Harry was aware of the fact that self-service gas pumps could
not be operated in connection with the cleaning business and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-7failed to inform Mrs. Bezner of this fact before delivering
to her for execution the final contracts (T. 163 and 164).
Mr. Steadman terminated his partnership with Mrs. Bezner in
the first week of November, 1912,

in that he found that the

setting up of his carpet, drapery and upholstery cleaning
business was taking all of his time and he could not devote
time to the cleaning business (T. 31, 32, 38, 39). Mrs. Bezner
paid out Mr. Steadman his interest in the business and continued
to operate the cleaning business until Mr. Harry finally retook
possession of it (T. 106, 123).
Mrs. Bezner made numerous attempts to obtain a schedule of
equipment (Schedule A) from Mr. Harry but was unsuccessful until
Mr. Zorn provided her with a list of equipment in April of 1973,
(T. 103, 104). The failure of Mr. Harry to provide a schedule
"A" of equipment to Mrs. Bezner forced her to request an extension
on filing her tax returns for the year 1972 (T. 105). The preparing
of the first financial statements of the operations of the business
were delayed until May of 1973.

It was at this time Mrs. Bezner

became aware that the business had been grossing only $400.00 and
$500.00 per week (T. 105).
In the first three or four months of operation of the
business Mrs. Bezner encountered numerous difficulties.

During

the first two weeks that Mrs. Bezner operated the business
considerable money was required to be put into the business
(T. 106). Mrs. Bezner's mother took ill in the early part of
November, 197 2, and Mrs. Bezner left the business and went to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-8Kansas to be with her mother.

Mrs. Bezner went to Kansas for

a week or more during the month of November and again in the
month of December, 1972 (T. 31, 107). Mr. Steadman operated
the cleaning shop during her absence.

While Mrs. Bezner was

away in December, 1972, the cleaning shop was damaged by water,
from a snow storm that had leaked through the roof (T. 32, 33,
34, 35, 36, 107). Mrs. Bezner incurred expenses of approximately
$330.00 in repairing the damages caused by the water that had
leaked through the roof (T. 108, 109). All of these problems,
coupled with the problem of trying to get Mr. Harry to repair
the roof (T. 110); the problems she encountered with regard to
the business license (T. 114, 115); also contributed to the
delay in preparing financial statements of the business operations.
In about the second or third week of June, 1972, Mrs.
Beznerfs husband, while cleaning the boiler room at the dry cleaning
shop, found a box containing the business records of the In-and-Out
Cleaners for the period that Continental Cleaners had operated
it beginning with the month of February, 1972, through September,
1972 (T. 115, 116, 121). Mrs. Bezner ran tapes on the records
to determine the gross business the shop had done for the eight
month period the records covered, and found that the shop had
averaged approximately $400.00 per week (T. 117, 118, 119, 121).
She had attempted to contact her attorney, but was not successful
until the middle of July (T. 122). That she, after consultation
with her attorney, authorized her attorney to send a letter to
Mr. Harry informing him that she elected to rescind the contract
and tendered back possession of the shop (T. 122, 123, 180). At
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-9this time she discontinued payments under the contract of
purchase on the lease agreement, and began winding down the
operation of the business.

Mr. Harry took no action after receiving

the letter in July, 1973, informing him that Mrs. Bezner had
elected to rescind the contract of purchase and requesting that
he retake possession of the premises until September 23, 1973,
(T. 180).
Prior to the time that it was conclusively determined by
Mrs. Bezner that the representation of Mr. Harry that the business
was grossing $1,000.00 per week was false, the representation as
to the value of the equipment as being $31,000.00 had not been
questioned.

It was after the discovery of these records Mr.

Steadman then questioned the represented value of the equipment
(T. 48).
That prior to Mr. Harry retaking possession of the cleaning
business on or about October 1, 1973, he negotiated a sale of
it to a Mr. Kiter in August or September of 1973 (T. 73, 74).
Mr. Kiter testified that Mr. Harry started negotiations for the
sale of the business to him in July of 1973 (T. 82). The
appellants in their statement of facts state that Mr. Kiter,
after he had purchased the In-and-Out Cleaners from Mr. Harry
and commenced its operations, did $1,100.00 business in one week,
which was the grand opening week, and that there were 18 weeks
over $900.00 unaffected by any rise in prices (T. 77-80).

The

appellant is in error, in that Mr. Kiter definitely stated that
the figures did not take into consideration that he had raised
prices substantially from the time that he purchased and took over
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-10the operations of the business (T. 80). That the price structure
was different and that the 18 weeks of business over $900.00
per week were during the entire period from October, 1973, to
March, 1975, and did not take into consideration the higher
prices charged for the cleaning and whether the weeks of the
higher income were in the peak period of the business year or
the low period of the business year (T. 80). Mr. Kiter
testified that the business had lost money since he had purchased
it and that it was not profitable as of March, 1975 (T. 80).
The Court submitted the case to the jury on special verdict
(R. 40-41).

The Court clearly and properly instructed the jury

as to the law and the burden of proof of plaintiff as set forth
in proposition number 1 of the special verdict and as set forth
in instruction number 20, as well as instruction number 8 (R. 104) f
number 15 (R. Ill), number 17 (R. 113), number 18, (R. 114), and
19 (R. 115). The jury clearly and without contradiction answered
each proposition of the special verdict (R. 40-41), and the
Court entered judgment on the verdict for $10,000, which was
the down payment made by Mrs. Bezner on the contract of purchase,
less rents due defendants under the lease and allowing the
defendants to retain all additional sums paid by Mrs. Bezner
as principle and interest under the purchase contract as rental
for the use of the equipment (R. 33-34, 40-41).
The Court in proposition number 2 of the special verdict
submitted the question of waiver to the jury, even though the
defendants had failed to plead anywhere in their answer or
counterclaim the affirmative defenses of waiver, estoppel,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-11laches or any other matter constituting avoidance or affirmative
defense to the action of plaintiff as required by Rule 8(c) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 127-130).

The jury answered

proposition number 2 submitted to them in the special verdict
as false, thereby finding that Mrs. Bezner, after she discovered
the false and fraudulent statement of Mr. Harry "that the business
was grossing $1,000.00 per week" acted with promptness and
did not waive her right to disaffirm and rescind the contract of
sale of the business (T. 40-41).
POINT I
REFUSAL TO GIVE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION OF DEFENDANTS/
APPELLANTS ON THE ISSUE OF WAIVER WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR.
The appellants assert that the submission of proposition
no. 2 of the special verdict to the jury without instruction was
prejudicial error.

Respondent takes the position that the issue

of waiver was not properly raised by appellants, and therefore,
the refusal of the Court to give appellants requested instructions, not withstanding exception duly taken, did not constitute
prejudicial error.

Respondent does not take issue with the

general rule that fraud or misrepresentation may be waived
and that the defense of waiver, ratification or estoppel to a
fraud action is clearly recognized in law.

However, the

defense of waiver, ratification or estoppel is an affirmative
defense which must be plead expressly by the party claiming
it.

The provisions of Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides as follows, to-wit:
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shallby the
set
forth
***
estoppel,
***
Digitized
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-12Appellants did not assert in their answer or counterclaim, or
any other pleadings in this action, the affirmative defense of
waiver, ratification, laches or estoppel.

Nor did the appel-

lants at any time during the trial of this case move the Court
to amend their pleadings so as to bring the issue of waiver
before the Lower Court.

Thus, the issue of waiver was not

properly raised by the appellants, and they were not entitled
to have the issue submitted to the jury.

(Siciliano -vs- D. &

R.G.W.R. Co., 12 U.2d 183; 364 P.2d 413). Rule 12(h) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, to-wit:
A party waives all defenses and objections
which he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no
motion, in his answer or reply, ***.
The provisions of Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, to-wit:
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for
relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto
if one is required, ***.
In Thomas -vs- Braffet's Heirs, 6 U.2d 57, 305 P.2d 507, the
Court said,
"It is no doubt true that Rule 8(c) requires
a party to set forth his affirmative defenses
and matters constituting avoidance; *** It is
al^o true that generally a failure to plead an
affirmative defense results in its waiver and
excludes it as an issue in the case." (Emphasis Added)
Therefore, the submission of proposition no. 2 without the
requested instruction of appellants would not constitute reversible error,

(Anderson -vs- Bingham and Garfield R. Co.,

117 Utah 197, 214 P.2d 607), the defense having been waived for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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failure to plead.

-13Appellants do not take issue with the language of proposition
no. 2 and that the same was not understandable to the jury.

In

Shupe -vs- Menlove, 18 U.2d 130,417 P.2d 246, (1966), the Court
held that if the language of instructions to jury is such that
issues are understandable and facts are ascertainable to resolve
issues, the trial court's failure to give instructions requested
by defendant will not constitute reversible error.

The facts of

this case were readily ascertainable and clearly established that
Mrs. Bezner acted with reasonable promptness after she learned
that the cleaning business had not grossed a $1,000.00 per week
as represented by Mr. Harry.

The first three months of operation

of the business by Mrs. Bezner was fraught with difficulties in
that additional money was required to be put into the business
for supplies and she commenced operation of the business at a slow
time of the business year.

Mrs. Bezner was required to be away

from the business during the months of November and December,
1972, to be with her mother who had taken ill.

The preparing of

financial statements for the operation of the business for the
year 1972 was delayed until May, 1973, by the fact that Mr. Harry
failed to provide Mrs. Bezner with a schedule of equipment.

Mrs.

Bezner discovered the records of the cleaning shop in June, 1973,
which then clearly established that the business had never grossed
$1,000.00 per week as represented by Mr. Harry.

She then took

action and in July, 1973, sent a letter to Mr. Harry telling him
that she elected to rescind the contract and tender back the
business to Mr. Harry.

Mr. Harry, after receiving the letter of

July, 197 3, took no action to retake possession of the business
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-14until October, 19 73.

However, Mr. Harry commenced negotiations

to sell the cleaning shop to Mr. Kiter in the latter part of
July or the first part of August, 1973, and did in fact sell the
shop to Mr. Kiter in August, 1973.

This action on the part of

Mr. Harry could be construed to be constructive retaking of the
business as early as August, 1973, with actual possession by
October 1, 1973.

The jury properly answered proposition no. 2

in light of all of these facts which were clearly ascertainable
to the jury, and these facts

and

circumstances would clearly

support the answer of the jury to proposition no. 2.
Trial by jury is a right fundamental and is sacred to the
citizen and once it has been granted and a verdict rendered, such
verdict should not be regarded lightly nor overturned without
good and sufficient reason and judgment should not be disturbed
merely because of error.

(Bowden -vs- D. & R.G.W.R. Co., 3 U.2d

444, 286 P.2d 240). Generally in any lawsuit of several days
duration, counsel can usually find matters upon which he may
claim error.

The reviewing Court will not reverse on mere error,

but only if it be substantial and prejudicial to the extent that
there is a reasonable likelihood that unfairness or injustice
has resulted. (Lamb -vs- Bangart,

U.2d

; 525 P.2d 602 (1974).

Where, as in this case, both parties had fair and full opportunity
to present their contentions and the evidence supporting them to
the Court and jury, all presumptions are in favor of the validity
of the verdict and the judgment.

In order for the verdict to be

overturned, there must exist errors which are substantial and
prejudicial in the sense that there is reasonable likelihood
+-Vi^+-
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-15(Rowley -vs- Graven Brothers, 26 U.2d 448, 491 P.2d 1206; Burnson
-vs- Strong, 17 U.2d 364, 412 P.2d 451; Gordon -vs- Provo City,
15 U.2d 287, 391 P.2d 430).
Should this Court determine that the refusal of the Lower
Court to give defendants1 requested instruction was error, then,
this Court must determine whether the error or irregularity was
such that there is a reasonable likelihood to believe that in
its absence there would have been a result more favorable to
the appellants.

In answering this question, the Court must survey

the whole evidence and after so doing the question must be answered in the negative, then there is no justifiable basis for
reversal

of a judgment.

(Rowley -vs- Graven Brothers, (supra.).

The Court, in the case of In Re Richards Estate, 5 U.2d 106, 297
P.2d 542, submitted the case to the jury by giving them only three
interrogatories and directing them to place an "X" opposite the
proposition with which they agreed.

The trial judge refused to

give proponents requested instructions.

This Court held that

the refusal of the Lower Court to give instructions was not basis
for reversal.,

unless the jury was insufficiently advised of the

issue they were to determine, or it appears that they would have
been confused or mislead to prejudice.

Appellants state that

the only question raised by their Point I on appeal is whether
the jury was entitled to be given some guiding instruction on
the issue of waiver.

That the fact that the Lower Court failed

to instruct the jury as to the legal effect of their finding
on proposition no. 2 was error.

This does not meet the test

of the above cited cases where the Court properly instructed the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-16specifically requiring the burden of clear and convincing evidence
and clearly instructed the jury on the elements necessary to be
proved by respondent to support a finding of fraudulent misrepresentation by clear and convincing evidence.

The refusal of the

requested instruction of appellants by the Lower Court would have
merely stated the legal effect of the answer to proposition no. 2,
and therefore, was not prejudicial error where the substance
thereof was contained in the instructions given by the Court,
specifically in proposition no. 2.
143, 239 P.2d 215).

(Hardman -vs- Thurman, 121 Utah

In reviewing the evidence as a whole, the

refusal to give defendants requested instruction was not error
where appellants were required to plead affirmatively the defense
of waiver, ratification or estoppel, and failed to do so; and thereby, waived this defense.

The substance of the requested instruction

was given by the Court in proposition no. 2 with proper instruction
as to burden of proof required in reaching the answer.

The special

verdict of the jury should be affirmed and the request of the appellants to reverse or set aside the verdict of the jury should be
denied.
POINT II
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE SPECIAL VERDICT
OF THE JURY OF FRAUD BY DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS.
Appellants, during the course of trial, motioned the Lower
Court to dismiss the action of respondent in that the evidence,
in the opinion of appellants, was insufficient to establish
fraud.

(T. 172-174).

The Lower Court denied the motion of

appellants and submitted the case to the jury under proper
instructions
asbyto
allW.of
elements
ofLawfraud
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-17be proved by respondent and instrucing the jury thoroughly that
they must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. (R. Ill,
113-116).

The juryf without contradiction, answered each propo-

sition of the special verdict. (R. 40-41).

In the case of

Lynch -vs- MacDonald, 12 U.2d 427, 367 P.2d 464, this Court said,
"That the Supreme Court had the duty to review evidence in the
light most favorable to trial Court's finding where judgment was
rendered in part on conflicting evidence."

The Supreme Court

affirmed the Lower Court's finding of fraud.
The question as to whether or not fraud has been established
by clear and convincing evidence is usually for determination by
the trial of fact.

In Condas -vs- Adams, 15 U.2d 132, 388 P.2d

803, this Court held that evidence was sufficient to present a
jury question as to whether the landlord had misrepresented to
tenants the quantity of hay which had been produced from the
land per year and as to whether he had misrepresented the water
supply available for the land.

The fact situation in the Condas

-vs- Adams, supra, case is very similar to this case.

The

owner of land represented that the land offered for lease would
produce 9 0 tons of hay per year.

The leasee later obtained

proof that the land had not produced 90 tons of hay in the years
prior to entering into the lease.

Mr. Harry represented to the

respondent that the cleaning shop was grossing approximately
$1,000.00 per week, but he did not have accurate records of what
the shop was doing.

(T. 24, 43, 91). At the time Mr. Harry

made the representation that he had no accurate records of what
the shop was in fact doing, his wife, Clair Harry, had operated
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-18which were sent to the main office of Continental Dry Cleaning.
(T. 175-176, 202). Mr. Harry, although he denied he had represented that the shop was doing $1,000.00 per week, attempted to
explain that the lack of records was due to the fact that his
former manager was stealing from him and that he was doing plant
work for other plants and work on an army contract which was not
included in the shop's daily records. (T. 177). Mr. Harry testified that the army work constituted 2,000 pieces per week.
Katherine Winters, a former employee of Mr. Harry, testified that
the army work consisted of 100 pieces per day at an average of
$.14 per item. (T. 178, 221, 222). Mr. Fannin testified that the
drapery work was included in the daily receipts and completely
dispelled Mr. Harry's claim of charge accounts not being included
in the daily records.

(T. 70-71).

Mr. Fannin also testified

that the shop averaged $400.00 per week during the time he was
its manager, and there never was a $1,000.00 week. (T.67-68).
The daily records of the shop were picked up by Mr. Harry, Mrs.
Harry and the drivers and kept at the main office of Continental
Dry Cleaning. (T. 63-64).

This was also confirmed by Mrs. Harry

and Katherine Winters. (T. 202-206, 219). Mr. Harry represented
that the price of the business was based upon $31,000.00 of
equipment and the fact the shop was grossing $1,000.00 per week.
(T. 18, 91, 92). That these representations were relied upon
by Mrs. Bezner in purchasing the business. (T. 19-29, 93). That
she agonized over the decision for 2h days.

(T. 25, 92). Mr.

Zorn, who received a commission for the sale of the business,
said that the selling price was determined by how much money it
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-19grossed in a year.

(T. 212). The representation that the business

was doing between $400.00 and $500.00 per week would not have
supported the $40,000.00 selling price under Mr. Zorn!s testimony.
In fact, Mr. Zorn admitted that he had told Mrs. Bezner that the
cleaning shop's break even point was $500.00 to $600.00 per week,
not that the shop was doing $500.00 per week.

(T. 213-214).

Mr.

Zorn further contradicted himself by stating that the cleaning
shop could do $1,000.00 to $1,500.00 per week by raising prices,
not on increased volume.

(T. 216).

Plaintiff/respondent established by sufficient and competent
evidence each of the essential elements of her alleged cause of
action for fraud and deceit to make out a prima facie case of
liability, and in so doing, the Court properly submitted the
matter to the jury under proper instruction for its decision.
(Oberg -vs- Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229) .

The evidence

presented on the issue of variance between what the cleaning
shop was actually grossing and what the shop grossed as represented by Mr. Harry and on the issues of disparity in business
experience between appellants as sellers and respondent as buyer,
and Mrs. Bezner!s reliance on Mr. Harry's representations, was
sufficient to take the case to the jury.

(Lewis -vs- White, 2 U.2d

101, 269 P.2d 865).
The instructions given to the jury by the Lower Court, principally instructions numbers 8, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20, follow
very closely the guidelines set down by the Supreme Court in
Stuck -vs- Delta Land and Water Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 P.791;
and Lewis Digitized
-vs-byWhite
(supra.), if anything, these instructions
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-20were more favorable to the appellants than the facts justified,
and therefore, should not be heard to complain.
Bateman, 18 U.2d 335, 423 P.2d 153).

(Motter -vs-

The evidence presented

clearly supports the verdict of the jury in finding that the
appellants fraudulently misrepresented the business to Mrs.
Bezner.

Substantial weight must be given to the juryfs deter-

mination when it clearly appears that the jury's findings were
based on the application of the standard of clear and convincing
evidence required by law, and therefore, the jury verdict must
stand.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT'S AWARD TO DEFENDANTS OF REASONABLE RENT
FOR THE EQUIPMENT PURCHASED UNDER CONTRACT WAS ARBITRARY
AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The Lower Court, in entering judgment on the verdict,
allowed defendants/appellants to retain all installment payments made by respondent, Mrs. Bezner, under contract of
purchase as the reasonable rental value of the equipment that
was to have been purchased under the contract rescinded by Mrs.
Bezner.

(R. 33-34, 29-30).

In 77 Am Jur 2d, Vendor and Pur-

chaser, § 565, it is stated:
As in other cases of rescission, the vendee is
ordinarily required to restore the status quo,
insofar as he has received any benefit, as a condition of his right to rescind; but he is not
required to put the other party in the same
situation in which he was before the contract,
where the latter has rendered it impossible by
the nature of his fraud or other act, ***.
It is generally recognized that upon rescission of a contract
of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a return of all money paid
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-21283 P. 435; Horiwitz -vs- David K. Richards & Co., 20 U.2d 232,
436 P.2d 794; Bethhe -vs- Bain, Ore., 240 P.2d 958). Mrs. Bezner
paid a total of $12,000.00 under the contract on the purchase
price of the cleaning shop.

Mr. Kiter testified that he pur-

chased the shop from Mr. Harry in August, 1973, for $28,000.00,
the balance owing on Mrs. Beznerfs contract at the time she
made her election to rescind the same.'

(T. 74). That the equip-

ment at the time Mr. Kiter purchased the cleaning shop from Mr.
Harry was in excellent condition and well worth the price of
$28,000.00.

(T. 79, 81-82).

In addition to the payments on

the principal amount of the contract, Mrs. Bezner paid interest
totalling $1,719.00.

(R. 33).

Admittedly, the law recognizes that appellants would be
entitled to some compensation for the use of the equipment by
Mrs. Bezner, prior to her discovering the fraud upon her and
her election to rescind the contract.

(See Eastman -vs- Overman,

11 U.2d 258, 358 P.2d 85; Case Credit Corp. -vs- Stark, Wash.,
392 P.2d 215). However, defendants/appellants made no claim for
rentals in any of their pleadings, nor did they present any
evidence as to what a reasonable rental for the equipment would
be for the period it was used.

The giving of $3,719.00 as

rental for the equipment to the defendants/appellants by the
Lower Court, without the benefit of testimony as to what in
fact was a reasonable rental, was arbitrary and was not supported
by any evidence whatsoever.

It is respectfully submitted that

respondent, Mrs. Bezner, should be allowed to recover back by
law the amount paid on the contract of purchase, the sum of
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OCR, may contain errors.
$12,000.00, and the Machine-generated
defendants/appellants
retain the interest

-22payments in the sum of $1,719.00 as reasonable rental for the
equipment in light of the fact that there was no testimony
before the Court as to what constituted a reasonable rental
for the equipment.

Therefore, the judgment on the verdict

should be amended accordingly.
POINT IV
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO REFUSE TO SUBMIT THE
FACTUAL QUESTION OF BREACH OF LEASE TO THE JURY.
Plaintiff/respondent in her complaint claimed that the
defendants/appellants had breached their lease agreement by
failing and refusing to repair water damage caused by water
that had built up on the roof of the premises and leaked down
through a seam in the parapet that had separated.

(R. 141, 228).

The testimony of Mr. Stedman and Mrs. Bezner was uncontradicted
as to the water damage that had occurred and Mrs. Bezner incurred
expenses in the sum of $330.00 to repair said damage.
36, 107-111).

(T. 32-

Mr. Bezner testified that the drain on the roof

in the lower area of the roof was raised two to three inches and
the water had to rise that height to get into it and that there
was a screen over it.

When the water rose to reach the level of

the drain, it would run in behind the flashing and parapet, which
was not sealed.

That he investigated personally and observed

where part of the flashing had been sealed, but it had pulled
loose, and therefore, allowed the water to run down into the
cleaning shop.

(R. 226-228).

Mr. Harry instructed Mr. Stedman

to call Layton Roofing for the purpose to come out and correct
the leaking problem and undertook to pay for what services and
repairs Layton
in Law
fact
rendered.
ThisBYU.
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It was also undisputed that Mr. Harry had prepared the

lease agreement in connection with the contract of purchase of
the In-And-Out Cleaners.

(T. 100-102).

The Lower Court con-

sidered the contract of purchase and the lease agreement as
two separate contracts, but also stated that they were interdependent and could not separate the two.

The Court raised the

question at the time of trial that if one of the contracts could
be rescinded by fraud or a breach occurred which would warrant
the rescission of the contract, then both contracts could be
rescinded in that they were interdependent.

(T. 172). Mr. Kiter

testified that he had experienced the same leaking problem on
two separate occasions since purchasing the cleaning shop from
Mr. Harry in August, 1973.

(T. 75).

In the case of Bullfrog Marina, Inc. -vs- Lentz, 28 U.2d 261,
501 P.2d 266, the Court stated:
Where two or more instruments are executed
together by the same parties contemporaneously,
***, in course of the same transaction, and
cover the same subject matter, they will be read
and construed together so far as determining
respective rights of the parties, even though
they do not in terms refer to each other. (Emphasis
Added)
There is no dispute that the lease agreement was a part of the
entire transaction between the parties and was entered into
simultaneously with the contract for the purchase of the cleaning shop.

Respondent submits that the rescission of the contract

of purchase for fraud warrants a recission and cancellation of
the lease in that they were interdependent.

A rescission and

cancellation of the lease should have resulted in an award of
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-24by reason of the water damage.
Appellants succeeded in convincing the Lower Court that
the provisions of paragraph 6 of the lease agreement relieved
them of any responsibility or liability for damages suffered
by Mrs. Bezner due to the leaking roof.

Paragraph 6 of the

lease agreement reads as follows:
That the party of the first part shall not be
liable for any damages occasioned by failure to
keep said premises in repair and shall not be
liable for any damage done or occasioned by or
from plumbing, gas, water, steam or other pipes
or sewage, or the bursting, leaking or running
of any washstand, tank, water closet or waste
pipe in above, upon, or about said building or
premises, nor from any damage occasioned by
water arising from acts or neglect of co-tenants
or other occupants of the same building.
It is the position of respondent that the Court should have applied the general rule of ejusdem generis in construing the
provisions of paragraph 6 quoted above in making its determination as to whether or not appellants would have been liable for
the damages occasioned by the water that had leaked into the
cleaning shop.

(U.S.F.&G. -vs- Tomlinson-Arkwright Co., Ore.

141 P.2d 817; Vogel -vs- Cobb, Okla. 141 P.2d 276, 148 ALR 774;
Trego -vs- WaKeeney State Bank, Kan. 519 P.2d 743).
The lease agreement contained conflicting paragraphs in
that paragraph 13 of said lease agreement required appellants
to keep the premises and exterior of the leased building in
good condition and state of repair.

Paragraph 13 of the lease

agreement reads as follows:
Party of the first part (Continental Cleaners)
agrees to keep the premises and exterior of the
leased building in good condition and state of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-25As a general rule of law, where the lease agreement is drawn
by the appellants, which is the undisputed fact in this case,
conflicts in the lease agreement are to be construed most
strongly against the landlord (appellants) where a question
of conflicting meaning arises.

(Wolfe -vs- White, 119 Utah

183, 225 P.2d 729). Generally an ambiguous lease is construed
most strongly against the lessor on the theory that he is
the party using the language thereof.

(Powerline Co. -vs-

Russells, Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 P.2d 906) .

Thus, the

scrivener-lessor becomes accountable for his words, which he
uses in his lease agreement in case of doubt.
27 U.2d 67, 493 P.2d 299) .

(Sine -vs- Rudy,

In the case of uncertainty as to the

meaning of a contract, it should be construed most strictly
against its framer.
P.2d 503).

(Seal -vs- Tayco, Inc., 16 U.2d 323, 400

Inasmuch as the lease agreement was drawn up by the

appellants through their attorney, the law requires it to be
strictly construed against appellants, and any conflict in the
terms and conditions of said lease agreement should be construed
against appellants and in favor of the respondent, Mrs. Bezner.
(Wingetts -vs- Butters, 28 U.2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007).

The fact

that there was a direct conflict and contradiction in the terms
of the lease agreement clearly raised a jury question as to a
breach of the lease agreement on the part of Continental Dry
Cleaners, which should have been submitted to the jury for its
determination as triers of the fact.

Respondent contends that

the conflict in the provisions of the lease agreement created
an ambiguity and the terms of the lease agreement should have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

K^^T-I

Machine-generated
OCR,
may contain
errors. nartv who had oreuared
^^r^o+-v*no^ ^rr^incf
^r»n^11
^nt-<z
. thp.

-26it.

(Guinand -vs- Walton, 22 U.2d 196, 450 P.2d 467; 25 U.2d

253, 480 P.2d 137; Wingetts -vs- Butters (supra.).

It is

respectfully submitted that the Lower Court errored when it
refused to submit the issue of breach of lease and the question of damages to the jury, and awarded to the appellants judgment for the sum of $600.00 for lease payments for the months
of August and September, 1973, in light of the fact that the
lease agreement was an integral part of the contract of
purchase and could well have been considered to have been
rescinded along with the contract of purchase; and for the
further reason that the lease agreement contained a direct
conflict in its terms and construction of the meaning of the
conflict should have been construed directly against appellants,
they being the party who had their attorney draw their lease
agreement and contract of purchase.

Respondent requests that

the Court reverse the Lower Court on the issue of breach of
lease with instructions to enter judgment in favor of respondent
against appellants for rescission of the lease agreement, and
awarding to respondent damages in the sum of $350.00 for repair
of the premises and damages occasioned by water, that being a
direct responsibility of the appellants.
CONCLUSION
The special verdict of the jury should be affirmed in that
no prejudicial error resulted to appellants by the refusal of
the Lower Court to give appellants requested instruction in
light of the fact that the substance of the requested instruction
was given by the Court in the language of proposition no. 2 of
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-27the special verdict.

Further, the issue of waiver was not

properly before the Lower Court in that appellants failed to
plead it as an affirmative defense as required under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore, waived the same.
The evidence of fraud, viewed as a whole, was more than sufficient to justify and support the verdict of the jury against
appellants by the applicable standard and burden of proof and
in view of the detailed instructions on the issue of fraud
given by the Lower Court to the jury.

Substantial weight must

be given to the jury's determination and it is clear that the
standard of clear and convincing evidence was met and the special
verdict of the jury should be affirmed.
Respondent was entitled to recover back all funds paid to
appellants on the contract of purchase of the cleaning shop as
a matter of law.

The giving of reasonable rents to the appel-

lants equal to the amount of the installment payments paid on
the contract of purchase exclusive of the original down payment
by the Lower Court was arbitrary and was not supported by the
evidence where appellants made no claim for rental value of the
equipment and presented no evidence as to what the reasonable
rental value for the equipment would be during the time respondent operated the cleaning shop.

The judgment on the verdict

of the Lower Court should be amended to include all amounts
paid by respondent on the purchase price of the contract, allowing appellants to retain only the sum paid as interest as
reasonable rent for the use of the equipment.

Further, the lease

agreement should be declared as rescinded together with the
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-28appellant, Continental Dry Cleaners, for the amount of the
repairs to the cleaning shop.

In the alternative, the special

verdict of the jury should remain in full force and effect, and
the judgment on the verdict, as requested to be amended, should
remain in full force and effect, and the issue of breach of
lease and the question of damages associated therewith be remanded to the Lower Court for further .hearing.
Respectfully submitted,

E. H. FANKHAUSER of
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKEAUSER & BEASLEY
Attorney for Respondent
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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